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Abstract: Panpsychists aspire to explain human consciousness, but can 
they also account for the physical world? In this paper, I argue that 
proponents of a popular form of panpsychism cannot. I pose a new 
challenge against this form of panpsychism: it faces an explanatory gap 
between the fundamental experiences it posits and some physical 
entities. I call the problem of explaining the existence of these physical 
entities within the panpsychist framework “the missing entities 
problem.” Spacetime, the quantum state, and quantum gravitational 
entities constitute three explanatory gaps as instances of the missing 
entities problem. Panpsychists are obliged to solve all instances of the 
missing entities problem; otherwise, panpsychism cannot be considered 




There is a lot to like about Philip Goff’s Galileo’s Error. The book is a concise 
introduction to the philosophy of consciousness. Without a loss of rigor, Goff brings 
the academic discussions of consciousness from the ivory tower to the broader public. 
Moreover, there is a lot to like about Goff’s preferred metaphysical theory—
panpsychism. Panpsychism brings a breath of fresh air to the stale debates between 
physicalists and dualists. It promises an account of human consciousness compatible 
with both the data of physics and introspection. Goff and fellow panpsychists aspire to 
solve the mystery of consciousness with a worldview shift. They posit that human 
consciousness and the physical world are of the same kind, are both essentially 
experiential. Although substantial, this re-thinking of the nature of reality seems 
justified if panpsychism can indeed deliver on its promises. 
 
I use this occasion to pose a new challenge against panpsychism. Panpsychists are 
standardly challenged for whether they can account for human consciousness. 
However, it has so far been neglected whether they can account for the physical world. 
I set out to explore this question by analyzing whether the entities entailed by some of 
our best theories of physics are compatible with panpsychism. I do this by analyzing 
aspects of Goff’s take on panpsychism both from Galileo’s Error and from his wider 
academic work. 
 
I argue that if panpsychism were true, the existence of at least some physical entities 
would be left unexplained. I call this the missing entities problem for panpsychism. I 
define three explanatory gaps between the hypothetical fundamental experiences 
(that panpsychists posit) and different physical entities as instances of this problem. 
Panpsychists are obliged to solve all instances of the missing entities problem. 
Otherwise, the worldview shift proposed by panpsychists is unwarranted, and 





2. Missing Entities 
 
Goff argues that Galileo’s error was to think that the quantitative vocabulary of physics 
fully captures the essences of physical entities. As Galileo himself puts this, in a famous 
passage:  
[the book of the universe] is written in mathematical language, and its 
characters are triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures. Without 
these it is humanly impossible to understand a word of it, and one 
wanders around pointlessly in a dark labyrinth. (2008, p. 183) 
Galileo was a mind-body dualist. He thought experiences are real, yet quite unlike 
physical entities. He saw experiences as essentially not only quantitative but moreover 
qualitative. He took this to entail that physical entities and experiences are different 
in kind. 
 
Contemporary philosophers of mind are, by and large, physicalists. Physicalists reject 
Galileo’s dualism due to theoretical considerations based on the current empirical 
evidence.1 Nonetheless, many physicalists follow Galileo in his putative error. They 
embrace the Galilean conception of physical reality (what Goff calls the “purely 
physical” conception). According to these physicalists, the fundamental entities are 
purely physical. In their view, the purely physical facts ground the experiential facts. 
“Grounding,” as I understand it, is a relation that holds between the more fundamental 
facts (as grounds) and the less fundamental facts (as groundees). Grounds determine 
and explain the obtaining of their groundees.  
 
Pure physicalism is often contested because it faces an explanatory gap between the 
pure physical and the experiential facts. An explanatory gap, simply put, means that 
there is no intelligible connection between a ground and a groundee.2  
 
 
1 Many physicalists argue that dualism violates the “causal closure” of the physical. See Papineau 
(2001). 
2 Readers seeking a more rigorous definition should think of explanatory gaps in terms of a lack of a 
priori entailment between grounds and groundees. See Chalmers and Jackson (2001). 
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To locate explanatory gaps, as a good heuristic, think about what an ideal reasoner 
could deduce about reality from its fundamental elements. For example, think of 
Laplace’s fictional demon. If Laplace’s demon could never deduce a groundee from its 
fundamental ground, then there is an explanatory gap between fundamental reality 
and that groundee. Plausibly, Laplace’s demon could deduce the properties of H2O 
(and, in general, of all purely physical groundees) from the fundamental, purely 
physical grounds. In contrast, plausibly, not even Laplace’s demon could deduce what 
red feels like (and, in general, what any experience feels like) from the purely physical 
facts. If so, pure physicalism faces the above-mentioned explanatory gap. 
 
Explanatory gaps matter because they might reveal mistakes in our conception of 
reality. They might indicate the falsity of the grounding claims they involve. Goff 
(2017, pp. 100–3) argues that there should be no explanatory gaps in true cases of 
grounding when the ground and groundee are thought under “transparent” concepts. 
In Goff’s usage, a transparent concept reveals the full essence of its referent; it reveals 
“what it is for that entity to be part of reality” (Goff 2017, p. 15). 
 
Goff argues that both pure physical and phenomenal concepts are transparent. Pure 
physical concepts refer to purely physical entities. As Goff (2017, p. 101) argues, they 
reveal that purely physical entities are essentially quantitative: their essences are pure 
physical structures. Phenomenal concepts, in contrast, are the concepts we use in 
introspection when thinking about experiences in terms of what they feel like. In Goff’s 
(2017, pp. 107–8) view, phenomenal concepts reveal that experiences are essentially 
qualitative: their essences are their phenomenal characters, are what experiences feel 
like.3  
 
I summarize Goff’s ideas in the following two theses: 
 
No Explanatory Gaps: There are no explanatory gaps in true cases of 
grounding where both the ground and the groundee are thought under 
transparent concepts. 
 
3 I take this to imply that the contents of an experience are the properties of the experience itself. As 
Goff puts it: “Arguably, the qualities in our experience just are, in their essential nature, experience-
characterizing properties” (2017, p. 161). 
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Transparency: Pure physical concepts and phenomenal concepts are 
transparent.  
 
Given No Explanatory Gaps and Transparency, the explanatory gap between the pure 
physical and the experiential facts entails that pure physicalism is false.4 
 
Goff aspires to fix Galileo’s error in the light of No Explanatory Gaps and 
Transparency. He and fellow panpsychists redefine the Galilean conception of 
fundamental physical reality. According to Goff’s preferred version of panpsychism, it 
is implausible that pure quantities could exist autonomously without having some 
deeper qualitative ground. Goff and fellow panpsychists posit that experiences are the 
perfect candidates for such a ground. In Goff’s own words: 
All we get from physics is this big black-and-white abstract structure, 
which we must somehow fill in with intrinsic nature. We know how to 
color in one bit of it: the brains of living organisms are colored in with 
consciousness. How to color in the rest? The most elegant, simple, 
sensible option is to color in the rest of reality with the same pen. (2019, 
p. 135) 
 
The resulting view is panpsychism. Or, more precisely, Russellian pure panpsychism. 
The adjective “Russellian” is in honor of the philosopher and mathematician Bertrand 
Russell. It designates the conviction (that Russell likewise held) that the fundamental 
physical structure of the cosmos has a qualitative ground. The adjective “pure” 
designates that fundamental reality is entirely experiential. The structure of the 
fundamental experiences is objective; it obtains independently of human observation.5 
Physics accurately describes this structure. If panpsychism is true, the fundamental 
physical structure of the cosmos is the structure of the fundamental experiences. 
 
 
4 It is worth noting that this argument does not apply to all versions of physicalism; some physicalists 
are happy to accept explanatory gaps between grounds and groundees. See Schaffer (2017) for a 
defense of such a view. 
5 And, in general, independently of the observations of any non-fundamental subject. 
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As Goff (2019, p. 113) points out, panpsychists typically conceive of the fundamental 
experiences as “unimaginably simple.” In their view, these simple hypothetical 
experiences ground both human experiences and all physical entities. 
 
Many contemporary panpsychists are moreover reductive panpsychists.6 They posit 
that the above-mentioned fundamental experiences are the building blocks of 
everything. I illustrate this idea with a theological metaphor: if such reductive 
panpsychism is true, all that God would need to do to create the cosmos is to create 
the fundamental experiences; everything else would follow metaphysically “for free.”7 
Moreover, epistemically, in line with No Explanatory Gaps, reductive panpsychism 
promises a cosmos without explanatory gaps. If reductive panpsychism (of the above 
kind) is true, the knowledge of the fundamental experiences would, in principle, entail 
knowledge of all other facts for an ideal reasoner. 
 
Throughout this paper, unless otherwise specified, I use “panpsychism” to refer to 
pure Russellian reductive panpsychism as I have defined it above. Goff is sympathetic 
to this version of panpsychism, both in Galileo’s Error and throughout his academic 
work.8 Panpsychism, so construed, seem to be the most cohesive, parsimonious, and 
widely accepted version. It is a form of experiential monism that aspires to explain 
human consciousness better than physicalism. 
 
It is not clear whether panpsychism can fulfill its explanatory promise. The 
panpsychist framework has two essential metaphysical seams: 
(a) between the fundamental experiences and human experiences, and  
(b) between the fundamental experiences and all physical entities.  
Panpsychists must be wary of any unclosable explanatory gaps at either of these seams. 
Unclosable explanatory gaps violate No Explanatory Gaps; they obtain even for 
 
6 More rigorously defined, “reductive panpsychism,” as I use the term here, is panpsychism that is 
both metaphysically and epistemically reductive; it is the conjunction of constitutive and type-A 
panpsychism. The kind of grounding at play here is “grounding by analysis,” in Goff’s (2017) 
terminology.  
7 I stress this is only a metaphor and a heuristic: panpsychists are not necessarily committed to the 
existence of God.  
8 Goff also explores and defends other versions of panpsychism such as: consciousness+ panpsychism, 
emergentist panpsychism, and hybrid panpsychism. I briefly discuss consciousness+ panpsychism in 
section 4. The rest of these views are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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reasoners with all the required transparent concepts. Unclosable explanatory gaps 
entail cracks in the elegant panpsychist framework; they entail that panpsychism—as 
I have defined it—is false. 
 
Case (a) corresponds to “the combination problem.”9 The combination problem is a 
serious and well-discussed problem for panpsychism. However, the combination 
problem is not the only serious problem that panpsychism faces. Given No 
Explanatory Gaps, panpsychists are obliged to resolve both (a) and (b). Case (b) is 
mostly ignored in the literature. I use this occasion to bring (b) into the spotlight. 
 
Against panpsychism, I argue that if fundamental reality were purely experiential, 
some physical entities might lack an intelligible explanation in terms of fundamental 
reality. If so, were we to rebuild the cosmos from pure experiences, these physical 
entities would be missing from our reconstruction of reality. I call the problem of 
explaining the existence of these physical entities the missing entities problem. I 
express this problem as a broad explanatory gap as follows: 
 
Missing Entities: There is an explanatory gap between the fundamental 
experiences (as grounds) and some physical entities (as groundees). 
 
In the rest of the paper, I show how to use Missing Entities to argue against 
panpsychism. 
 
A note on terminology. I use the term “entity” in a broad sense. In my usage, directly 
observable entities (such as tables and planets), indirectly observable entities (such as 
spacetime and micro-particles), and purely theoretical entities (such as the quantum 
state and spin networks) all count as entities. The challenge I raise against 
panpsychism is that experiences do not have the right structure to be the grounds of 
all physical entities.   
 
9 For more on the combination problem see Chalmers (2016). 
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3. Three Explanatory Gaps 
 
The three principles referred to above—No Explanatory Gaps, Transparency, and 
Missing Entities—work together as premises in an argument against panpsychism that 
I call “the missing entities argument”:  
 
P-1. No Explanatory Gaps is true. 
P-2. Transparency is true. 
P-3. Missing Entities is true. 
C. Panpsychism is false. 
 
If sound, the missing entities argument entails that at least some physical entities are 
not grounded in the fundamental experiences. If so, going back to the theological 
metaphor I used earlier: it would not be enough that God creates the fundamental 
experiences to create the cosmos. Instead, God would need to do more to bring the 
missing entities into existence. If so, experiences alone are not enough to recreate the 
cosmos. Thus, panpsychism is false.10  
 
Goff (2017, pp. 100–3) explicitly defends P-1 and P-2. I expect these two premises to 
be uncontroversial for reductive panpsychists. Rejecting P-1 and P-2 undermines a key 
motivation for panpsychism. Without No Explanatory Gaps and Transparency, 
panpsychists would struggle to reject physicalism based on explanatory gap worries. 
Thus, panpsychists are better off accepting P-1 and P-2.  
 
With P-1 and P-2 out of the way, I dedicate the rest of this section to the defense of P-
3. I defend P-3 by defining three explanatory gaps as instances of it. They involve 
spacetime, the quantum state, and quantum-gravitational entities. All three of these 
gaps involve experiences (as grounds) and pure physical entities (as groundees). All 
three gaps express the same idea, the idea that the structure of the cosmos is essentially 
 
10 As I stated already, the missing entities argument only targets pure Russellian reductive 
panpsychism. Impure (and thus, more complex) forms of panpsychism positing both experiences and 
physical structure as fundamental are not its target. 
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different from the structure of experiences.11 Beyond these three gaps, there might be 
other ways to specify P-3 involving different physical entities or properties. It only 
takes one instance of Missing Entities to challenge panpsychism. The panpsychist is 
obliged to close all known instances of Missing Entities.  
 
In the case of all three explanatory gaps, I set out to establish Missing Entities by first 
analyzing human experiences and then inferring that the hypothetical fundamental 
experiences are similar. I base this inference on the following thesis:   
 
Good Model: Human experiences are a good model for the fundamental 
experiences posited by panpsychists. 
 
Good Model might appear controversial. It entails that human experiences can be used 
as proxies for the putative fundamental experiences. It entails that we are justified to 
use the available transparent concepts of human experiences—referenced in 
Transparency—in place of the unavailable transparent concepts of the putative 
fundamental experiences. If so, the phenomenal concepts involved in Missing Entities 
are covered by Transparency. This consequence of Good Model might appear overly 
strong, given that the fundamental experiences are unknown. Panpsychists broadly 
agree that humans do not directly access the fundamental experiences. 
 
In defense of Good Model, I point out that fundamental experiences are a theoretical 
posit. Their primary role is to explain human experiences. Human experiences are our 
only guide to the fundamental experiences. Thus, I take that it is reasonable to assume 
the fundamental experiences must be similar to human experiences. How similar? 
Similar enough to ensure there is no explanatory gap between them (as grounds) and 
human experiences (as groundees). 
 
Rejecting Good Model comes at a high price for the panpsychist. First, it shrouds 
panpsychism in mystery. If the fundamental experiences are a complete mystery, it is 
 
11 Thus, Missing Entities is like the hard problem of consciousness in reverse. In the role of P-3, 
Missing Entities resembles the hard problem turned upside-down an put to use against the 
panpsychist. 
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impossible to investigate how they might ground the rest of reality. Second, and more 
importantly, it turns the combination problem into a potentially unclosable chasm. If 
the fundamental experiences are not similar to our experiences, it is unreasonable to 
expect they could intelligibly explain our experiences. In light of this, Good Model 
presents the panpsychist with a dilemma: either (1) reject Good Model but shroud 
panpsychism in mystery and face a potently unsolvable combination problem, or (2) 
accept Good Model but deal with the missing entities argument. The missing entities 
argument targets panpsychists willing to accept horn (2) of this dilemma. I count Goff 
among these panpsychists, given his persistent ambition to solve the combination 
problem in his academic work.  
 
3.1. The Spacetime Gap 
 
The first gap involves spacetime as a groundee.  
 
Spacetime Gap: There is an explanatory gap between the fundamental 
experiences (as grounds) and spacetime (as a groundee). 
 
The theory of relativity is our best current theory of space and time. 12 The theory of 
relativity—in its most straightforward ontological interpretation—entails the existence 
of spacetime. The theory of relativity, so understood, is a substantivalist theory of 
spacetime. If spacetime substantivalism is true, spacetime is a ubiquitous and dynamic 
entity with no further physical ground. In this section, I assume that spacetime 
substantivalism is true, and I base Spacetime Gap on it.  
 
Spacetime has an essential geometric structure. It is a four-dimensional manifold 
structured by the spacetime metric. In geometry, metric structures determine 
distances. The spacetime metric determines the spacetime distance between any two 
events in spacetime.13 Spacetime distances are invariant; they are the same for all 
 
12 By “the theory of relativity,” I have in mind the conjunction of the special and the general theory of 
relativity. 
13 What I call the “spacetime distance” is often called the “spacetime interval” in the physics literature 
(standardly designated as “(Δs)2”). Here, I use the term “spacetime distance” both for simplicity and 
to emphasize that this quantity is the spacetime analog of the Euclidean distance. 
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observers. If spacetime’s metric structure were different, the theory of relativity would 
no longer apply to spacetime; spacetime would no longer be the same entity, it would 
no longer be spacetime. If so, the spacetime metric is likely essential to spacetime.14 
 
Visual experiences, more than any other experiences, are associated with distances. I 
can clearly see and measure the distance between two points on a line, and I can clearly 
tell that some objects are close to me while others are further away from me. Thus, it 
appears that at least some visual experiences might be essentially metric. If so, could 
some visual experiences, in some contexts, instantiate the spacetime metric? 
 
The spacetime metric entails facts of positive distances but also of negative and null 
distances. The distinction between positive, negative, and null spacetime distances 
constitutes spacetime’s causal structure. These three kinds of spacetime distances 
obtain everywhere in spacetime: at all scales and in all regions. There are perfectly 
natural reference frames in every cell of our bodies where spacetime events are at 
positive distances but also at negative and null distances from one another.  
 
Human experiences, in contrast to spacetime, seem to instantiate only positive 
distances. Our ordinary concept of distance is the concept of a positive quantity 
separating some entities. Although negative and null distances are coherent, they 
appear to be neither perceivable nor imaginable. If so, given that phenomenal 
concepts are transparent, it seems reasonable to assume that no human visual 
experience essentially has the spacetime metric.  
 
Beyond visual experiences, the same point seems to apply to all other human 
experiences. To the best of my introspective ability, I cannot find any experience that 
exhibits the properties of spacetime’s metric structure. To the best of my introspective 
ability, no human experience instantiates negative and null distances. If so, again, 
given that phenomenal concepts are transparent: no human experience appears to 
have the spacetime metric. 
 
 
14 In the literature, this metaphysical position is known as metric essentialism; its locus classicus is 
Maudlin (1989). 
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Putting the above together: spacetime essentially has the spacetime metric, while all 
human experiences lack the spacetime metric. If so, via Good Model, the putative 
fundamental experiences (posited by the panpsychist) likely lack the spacetime metric. 
If so, it seems that not even an ideal intellect (like Laplace’s demon) could deduce 
spacetime’s existence from the putative fundamental experiences. Thus, Spacetime 
Gap is true. 
 
If panpsychism is true, spacetime is a dependent entity grounded in the putative 
fundamental experiences. Thus, although spacetime has no further physical ground, it 
has an experiential ground. However, Spacetime Gap—in the role of P-3 of the missing 
entities argument—entails that if panpsychism were true, spacetime would lack an 
explanation in terms of fundamental reality. Thus, if panpsychism were true, there 
might be no spacetime. Thus, if spacetime substantivalism is true, Spacetime Gap, as 
a premise of the missing entities argument, entails that panpsychism is false.  
 
3.2. The Quantum State Gap 
 
The second gap involves the high-dimensional quantum state, posited by some 
proponents of realist quantum theories, as a groundee. 
 
Quantum State Gap: There is an explanatory gap between the 
fundamental experiences (as grounds) and the high-dimensional 
quantum state (as a groundee). 
 
Quantum theory is our best current theory of matter. Quantum theory’s predictive 
power is undeniable, yet its ontological implications are an enigma. The wave function 
is the central mathematical device of quantum theory. According to proponents of 
realist quantum theories, the wave function is not only a useful mathematical device; 
instead, it represents a real entity.15 Philosopher of physics Tim Maudlin (2019) calls 
this entity the “quantum state.” 
 
 
15 Realist quantum theories include Bohmian, Everettian, and spontaneous collapse quantum theories.  
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The properties of the quantum state are a matter of heated debate. There is a lot of 
disagreement about how much of the wave function’s mathematical structure 
corresponds to the quantum state’s structure. Specifically, one question of key 
importance is whether the quantum state has the same number of dimensions as the 
wave function. 
 
The wave function’s domain is standardly called a configuration space. It is typically 
characterized as 3N dimensional, where N stands for the number of particles it 
describes. The universe is estimated to have at least 1080 particles. If so, the 
configuration space of our universe’s wave function has at least 3 × 1080 dimensions. 
 
Proponents of (what I call) high-dimensionalism argue that the quantum state is 3N 
dimensional, just like our universe’s wave function. In their view, the 3D space aspect 
of spacetime is grounded in the 3N dimensional quantum state. Quantum State Gap 
involves this high-dimensional conception of the quantum state. 
 
Contributors to this volume Alyssa Ney (2012) and Sean Carroll (2019), are notable 
proponents of high-dimensionalism. It is worth noting that Goff (forthcoming) argues 
against high-dimensionalism based on the worry that it cannot account for the reality 
of human consciousness. Thus, this section is not directly an attack on Goff’s view but 
is aimed more generally at panpsychists sympathetic towards high-dimensionalism. 
 
Given high-dimensionalism, the quantum state is essentially 3N dimensional. The 
complexity of the quantum state, so defined, is staggering. It is impossible to imagine 
(or otherwise experience) anything even remotely close to this high-dimensional 
structure. If so, and given the transparency of phenomenal concepts: clearly, no 
human experience is essentially 3 × 1080  dimensional. 
 
By now, my defense of Quantum State Gap should be obvious. If panpsychism is true, 
the quantum state is grounded in some fundamental experiences. However, via Good 
Model, it is reasonable to assume that none of the putative fundamental experiences 
is 3 × 1080  dimensional. Based on this, were panpsychism true, not even Laplace’s 
demon could deduce the existence of the quantum state from the fundamental 
experiences. Thus, Quantum State Gap is true. 
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Quantum State Gap—in the role of P-3 of the missing entities argument—entails that 
if panpsychism were true, the high-dimensional quantum state would lack an 
explanation in terms of fundamental reality. If panpsychism were true, there might be 
no high-dimensional quantum state. Thus, if high-dimensionalism is true, Quantum 
State Gap, as a premise of the missing entities argument, entails that panpsychism is 
false.  
 
3.3. The Quantum Gravity Gap 
 
The third gap involves the timeless quantum-gravitational entities, posited by some 
theories of quantum gravity, as groundees. 
 
Quantum Gravity Gap: There is an explanatory gap between the 
fundamental experiences (as grounds) and timeless quantum-
gravitational entities (as groundees). 
 
Theories of quantum gravity aspire to explain gravity in a way that is compatible with 
quantum theory. Some theories of quantum gravity aspire to accomplish this by 
quantizing spacetime. Contributor to this volume Carlo Rovelli (2004), is a leading 
figure in the development of one such theory: loop quantum gravity. These theories 
of quantum gravity posit that spacetime, as a whole, is grounded in fundamental 
structures that lack a spatial and temporal metric. These structures seem to be 
essentially neither spatial nor temporal. 
 
I use the term “timeless quantum-gravitational entity” as a blanket term for any 
fundamental entity that lacks an essential temporal metric and is posited by a theory 
of quantum gravity. 16  The postulated existence of timeless quantum-gravitational 
entities gives rise to Quantum Gravity Gap.  
 
 
16 In loop quantum gravity, the timeless quantum-gravitational entities are called “spin networks.”  
15 
Time appears to be an essential property of all human experience. 17  No human 
experience seems possible unless it has some temporal duration, unless it lasts some 
time. This should be plain to everyone who has reflected on any ordinary experience. 
If human experiences are essentially temporal, via Good Model, it follows that the 
putative fundamental experiences are likewise temporal. If so, Quantum Gravity Gap 
is true. 
 
Quantum Gravity Gap is not a new challenge for panpsychism. Susan Schneider 
(2018) has already risen an analogous challenge. Goff acknowledges her challenge and 
offers a tentative solution (2019, pp. 209–10). Based on Miri Albahari’s (2019) work, 
he suggests that one kind of human experience might be essentially timeless. This is 
mystical experience. Mystical experiences are typically induced either by deep 
mediation or by the use of psychedelics. They have been reported across many 
different cultures and religions. People who have undergone mystical experiences 
often describe them as experiences of pure oneness beyond space and time.  
 
Given that phenomenal concepts are transparent, mystical experiences might be 
essentially timeless. However, this alone is not sufficient to close Quantum Gravity 
Gap. Closing Quantum Gravity Gap requires experiences that both (a) are essentially 
timeless and (b) have the right kind of timeless structure. I argue that even if mystical 
experiences satisfy (a), they most likely fail to satisfy (b). The “right kind of timeless 
structure” required in (b) is the structure of the specific quantum-gravitational entities 
we are trying to ground. I illustrate this by reference to Spacetime Gap. 
 
To close Spacetime Gap, it is not sufficient that some experience has some metric. 
Instead, some experience must have the spacetime metric. Likewise, to close Quantum 
Gravity Gap, it is not sufficient that some experience has some timeless structure. 
Instead, some experience must have the structure of the specific quantum-
gravitational entities they are expected to ground (or, at least, a structure sufficiently 
similar to allow for an intelligible connection).  
 
 
17 For an independent defense of this claim, see Phillips (2014). 
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It is highly unlikely that mystical experiences have the structures of quantum-
gravitational entities. Reports indicate that timeless mystical experiences are 
experiences of pure oneness, without any differentiation.18 Thus, plausibly, they lack 
any definable structure. If so, via Good Model, it follows that the timeless fundamental 
experiences are likely to lack any definable structure. Moreover, given Transparency, 
if mystical experiences had a structure even roughly resembling that of quantum-
gravitational entities: mystics would have told us about it by now. Yet, they have not. 
Instead, it was physicists who developed quantum gravity. Thus, again, via Good 
Model, it follows that even if there are timeless fundamental experiences, their 
structure is likely not similar to that of quantum-gravitational entities.  
 
In summary, timeless quantum-gravitational entities have specific timeless structures. 
The reports of mystical experiences indicate that some human experiences might be 
essentially timeless. However, these experiences seem to lack structures similar to the 
ones posited by theories of quantum gravity. If so, via Good Model, it follows that the 
putative fundamental experiences likewise lack timeless quantum-gravitational 
structure. If so, were panpsychism true, not even Laplace’s demon could deduce the 
existence of these timeless quantum-gravitational entities from the fundamental 
experiences. Thus, Quantum Gravity Gap is true. 
 
Quantum Gravity Gap—in the role of P-3 of the missing entities argument—entails 
that if panpsychism were true, timeless quantum-gravitational entities would lack an 
explanation in terms of fundamental reality. If panpsychism were true, there might be 
no timeless quantum-gravitational entities. Thus, if any of the theories positing such 
entities is true, Quantum Gravity Gap, as a premise of the missing entities argument, 




18 See Albahari (2019). 
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4. The Consciousness+ Response  
 
Missing Entities is true if at least one of the above explanatory gaps is true. If Missing 
Entities is true, given my previous defense of the other premises, the missing entities 
argument is sound. If so, panpsychism is false.  
 
The missing entities argument refutes a specific version of panpsychism that is pure, 
Russellian, and reductive. This is one version of panpsychism that Goff is sympathetic 
towards. However, he also defends other versions. Notably, in his academic work, Goff 
(2017, pp. 179–81, 230–5) develops a unique version of panpsychism he calls 
“consciousness+ panpsychism.” 
 
Consciousness+ panpsychism posits that fundamental reality is constituted of 
consciousness+ properties. These hypothetical properties enfold “experiential and 
non-experiential aspects into a single nature.” (Goff 2017, p. 180) Consciousness+ 
panpsychism is impure, Russellian, and reductive. Goff develops it as one potential 
solution to the combination problem. 19  The non-experiential aspects of 
consciousness+ are completely mysterious. Goff argues that the addition of these 
hidden aspects to experiences might solve the combination problem.  
 
Goff envisions consciousness+ panpsychism as metaphysical monism. 
Consciousness+ properties are supposed to be unitary. This makes sense in the context 
of solving the combination problem. Presumably, the experiential aspects of 
consciousness+ explain human experiences qua experiences. In contrast, presumably, 
their plus-aspects explain how the putative fundamental experiences combine into 
human experiences. If so, both the experiential and non-experiential aspects of 
consciousness+ have necessary explanatory roles in solving the combination problem.  
 
The missing entities argument fails to refute consciousness+ panpsychism. As I have 
argued, experiences alone cannot close Missing Entities. However, consciousness+ 
properties might close Missing Entities in virtue of their plus-aspects. If so, 
 
19 It is worth noting that Goff also proposes other potential solutions to the combination problem. 
Perhaps the most notable among these is his “phenomenal boding” proposal (Goff 2016).  
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consciousness+ panpsychism avoids both the combination and the missing entities 
problem. Nevertheless, I believe, stretching the explanatory role of consciousness+ 
properties this far might come at a price. The price is the loss of monism.  
 
Let us assume—as Goff argues—that Galileo’s conception of the physical world is 
mistaken. Thus, contra Galileo, physical entities have some deeper qualitative ground. 
Moreover, suppose we are justified to posit consciousness+ properties to explain 
human consciousness (perhaps due to explanatory gap worries). So far, so good. Now, 
ask yourself: what is the best candidate for the deeper qualitative ground of physical 
entities? 
 
Missing Entities indicates that experiences alone (as long as they are similar to our 
human experiences) are not apt to ground the physical world.20 On the other hand, the 
plus-aspect of consciousness+ is tailor-made for closing explanatory gaps. It seems 
that, when it comes to grounding the physical world, the plus-aspect can do all the 
explanatory work and do it alone. In contrast, experiences can do this same 
explanatory work only if assisted by the plus-aspect. This indicates that the 
experiential aspect of consciousness+ might be explanatory redundant in closing 
Missing Entities. 
 
If I am right about the above, the plus-aspect of consciousness+ seems to be the best 
candidate for the qualitative ground in the scenario under consideration. Although the 
two aspects of consciousness+ come together in solving the combination problem, they 
come apart in closing Missing Entities. But then, is there any strong reason to think 
consciousness+ is unitary? We might as well be dualists at this point.  
 
Consider the following dualist view.21 Imagine a cosmos where two distinct kinds of 
properties are fundamental: non-experiential (physical) qualities and experiences. 
The physical qualities ground the physical world. The fundamental experiences 
correlate with them throughout the cosmos: like a ghost in the machine. Yet, these 
fundamental experiences do not ground any physical entities. The two kinds of 
fundamental properties come together in complex systems (such as humans). There, 
 
20 Assuming, of course, that one of the theories of physics I have examined is true. 
21 Or rather: dualist panpsychism.  
19 
they mutually ground higher-order experiences. Although rough, this sketch seems 
coherent. The onus is on Goff to explain why his monistic consciousness+ 






Panpsychism promises a lot. It is a well-motivated and elegant metaphysical theory. 
However, panpsychism faces serious challenges from both the combination problem 
and, as I argued, the missing entities problem. I used this opportunity to elucidate the 
missing entities problem as a new problem for panpsychism. 
 
All the instances of Missing Entities I outlined express the same underlying idea: The 
structures of the cosmos are essentially different from the structures of experiences. I 
based Missing Entities on an inference from human experiences to the putative 
fundamental experiences. Our experiences can ground rich structures. Yet, the 
structures of the cosmos are richer. The structures of the cosmos are beyond the 
structures of our experiences. I argued, via Good Model, that panpsychism is most 
likely to work if the fundamental experiences it posits are similar to our experiences. 
Missing Entities is the outcome of this inference. Missing Entities—as a premise of the 
missing entities argument—entails that the physical structure of the cosmos cannot be 





22 At the very least, the fundamental experiences certainly cannot be unimaginably simple, as Goff 
and many other panpsychists posit. 
23 I am deeply grateful to Philip Goff for his comments on the paper, and more importantly, for 
teaching me about panpsychism and then inviting me to argue against it. Many thanks also to Jamie 
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